let-live solution 8 is not only desirable but possible "if we have the will to do so," 9 and second, that to do otherwise than accommodate would be untrue to this nation's tradition of religious liberty. 10 This Essay will sharply contest both of these claims with respect not so much to their normative desirability as to their descriptive accuracy. Even when the claim for a win-win, live-and-let-live solution is limited to same-sex marriage or to gay rights more generally, ever since I first seriously engaged with this claim more than five years ago, 11 I have been profoundly skeptical as a descriptive matter that such a solution could be concretely constructed, let alone successfully implemented. In part, this is because, as I shall discuss below, proponents of accommodations they claimed were designed to live-and-let-live initially tended to isolate issues of gay rights without ever even acknowledging that they are far from the only issues as 9. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 840. 10. Just as space limitations foreclose me from setting out below any of my own arguments in the detail they would require to be fully convincing, they also force me to lump together under the umbrella of "live-and-let-live" a number of scholars, each of whom has his or her own nuanced view of what religious accommodations are possible and desirable and why. To the extent I am aware of differences that matter to my arguments herein, and to the extent space permits, I do my best to note them.
11. I have, of course, been thinking and writing about religious reaction to same-sex marriage claims for far longer than five years. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1792-97 (2005) (analyzing the effect of the conflation of religious and civil marriage in the United States on the stakes for Protestants in the same-sex marriage debates). In 2009, however, I was asked to prepare a comment for the Princeton symposium, see supra note 1, on Koppelman and Dent's draft, "Must Gay Rights Conflict With Religious Liberty?" and, like most of the others asked to comment, was so critical of the proposal that my announced aim of having Koppelman withdraw it succeeded. At about that same time, I was also publishing the first fruits of my feminist fundamentalism project, discussed further infra, see to which there is strong religiously motivated objection, let alone discussing the extent to which [their] proposed framework should be or the reasons why it should not be applied to any of these other issues. 12 One of the fears I announced in 2009 13 has indeed come to pass-the insistent claim for religious accommodation has in the intervening years extended far beyond gay rights to other sexual rights, other reproductive and family recognition rights, and women's rights.
14 I have a strong personal normative stake in fighting this expansion, 15 committed as I am to what I have called feminist fundamentalism, 16 defined in my case as an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes and to the abolition of fixed sex roles. But my principal focus in this Essay will remain on the practical and legal, not the ideological problems with this expansion. 17 In particular, as I shall discuss, this expansion of claims for accommodation does not solve, but rather compounds, the problem of selective attention to only a subset of the laws and regulations to which religiously motivated actors might have a conscientious objection.
12. Memorandum from Mary Anne Case to Andrew Koppelman and George Dent at 1 (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Memo to Koppelman and Dent] (on file with author) (circulated in preparation for the Princeton Conference described supra note 1 to discuss Koppelman and Dent's proposal for religious accommodation in the context of gay rights).
13. See id. at 10 ("Whether under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, numerous employers have litigated and lost their claim that their religious views justified them in refusing to hire or promote women or to pay them equally with men. Would your proposal not only upset this settled law but expand the range of employers who could use religious exemptions to discriminate against women?" (footnote omitted)).
14. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 15. I readily concede my strong personal stake in these issues, but find it equally worthy of note that neither Koppelman nor Laycock has a similarly strong stake-they are neither devout nor gay nor female. It is a lot easier to endorse compromise when you have no dog of your own in the fight, nor ox to be gored. By contrast, even with respect to same-sex marriage, I am not merely an ally of lesbians and gay men; as a feminist fundamentalist, I have a direct personal stake in "genderless marriage."
16. For my definition of feminist fundamentalism and an exploration of its many analogies to religious commitments, see generally Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and Constitutional Commitment, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 549, 550 (2011) (defining feminist fundamentalism as "an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes as intense and at least as worthy of respect as, for example, a religiously or culturally based commitment to female subordination or fixed sex roles").
17. I also do not take on the normative question of live-and-let-live as a guiding principle. While, at an abstract level, this principal is endorsed even by Pope Francis, who listed it as number one in his "top 10 secrets to happiness," my point is that the devil remains in the details. proposed by proponents of a live-and-let-live solution to the sexual culture wars are neither workable nor "in the tradition of American liberty." 27 It is noteworthy that not even with respect to the concrete proposals for religious exemption they have actually endorsed, let alone with respect to the host of comparable claims for accommodation foreseeably waiting in the wings, have the proponents of live-and-let-live set forth in any detail how the proposed religious accommodations they urge legislatures and courts to adopt would actually work in practice. 28 This lack of detail is not the only respect in which, as a descriptive 27. Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 429-30. 28. If there is a fully detailed proposal out there I have missed, I would welcome access to it. As things stand, I have personally asked for details from many of the more prominent advocates of liveand-let-live solutions and received to date either no response or a frank acknowledgement that many of the details remain to be worked out. Nothing I have seen walks through the elements of an exemption case, including who has the burden of production and of proof of what, especially if the law provides an accommodation only if there is an alternative provider reasonably available. These sorts of details should matter to the conscientious objector, since, for example, small businesses would want to know what sort of risk they are assuming when they decline service. For example, is it incumbent on the provider to inquire up front, before taking an order, whether the service might be objectionable? If no upfront inquiry is made, but the provider learns before performance that, for example, the flowers are for a same-sex wedding, is breach then permissible? Does the provider have the burden of specifying the reasonable alternative? If so, when-at the time of refusal or only in court? If the provider does bear the burden of identifying an alternative at the time of refusal of service, this in itself may pose a problem for the provider's conscience. If the provider does not have the obligation to offer an alternative, what is the burden on the customer? How many other providers does s/he have to locate and try to do business with and how fungible does their service have to be in terms of either price or quality or accessibility? Is having to run through a dozen refusals before finding a willing provider enough to meet the exemptions requirement of no readily available substitute? If the customer has no car does it matter that there's no other provider in walking distance? If the customer has no Internet access, does it matter that there's no other provider in the local phone book? If the service is a custom service, will an off-the-rack alternative do? How much does it matter if the service is a luxury good like a wedding cake or a necessity like emergency medical care? (There certainly are cases in the abortion context where women refused by one hospital suffered grave health consequences on their way to another one; similarly, with respect to the morning-after pill, every hour that goes by after intercourse and before access to it decreases its effectiveness.)
In the case of a general exemption which by its terms depends on there being an adequate substitute provider, one cannot simply assume there will be a thick market for services. One first has to define, in each very particular case, what constitutes a sufficiently thick market and then establish that such a market does exist in that particular case. Were I a lawyer advising a would-be conscientious objector who was only prepared to refuse service if s/he would be legally protected in doing so, I honestly would not know what exactly the conditions on the ground would have to be to ensure a safe harbor. I am not claiming these sorts of practical questions are unanswerable; I am merely suggesting that the fact that every proponent of exemptions I have talked to acknowledges s/he has not developed an answer for them should give one serious pause before adopting an exemption proposal.
For some additional sense of the potential problems with working out the details, see Even this offer of a liveand-let-live compromise, however, sought to create an advantageous monopoly for religion by taking the use of the word "marriage" away from the public sphere (and hence from the proponents of sexual liberty and equality, who include not only same-sex marriage proponents but also opponents of the notion that it was a wife's duty "graciously to submit to her husband's . . . leadership"). Cf. Case, supra note 19, at 318 (discussing privatization and formalization by the Southern Baptists of marital doctrines of female subordination they could previously use state law to enforce, but which had been taken constitutionally out of bounds for the state by the late twentieth century).
perfectionist impulse to enshrine as secular law and enforce against their opponents their own religious views; 34 they only began to retreat from perfectionism into claims of uncompromising conscientious objection 35 once they saw themselves on the losing end of the culture war. 35. I am invoking here a distinction between perfectionism (defined as a willingness to impose on others) and fundamentalism (defined as an unwillingness to compromise oneself) I developed in the course of my project on feminist fundamentalism. For a discussion of this distinction, see, for instance, Case, supra note 16, at 550-53; for an application of it to religious opponents of same-sex and of egalitarian marriage, see, for instance Case, supra note 19, at 317. As I explained in Feminist Fundamentalism, supra note 16, with respect to any given commitment or set of commitments, one can be either a perfectionist, a fundamentalist, both or neither. One can decide one will not compromise without wishing to impose or that one wishes to impose and, in the interests of that imposition, compromise. I am well aware of the danger of using a term with many meanings like "fundamentalist" or even "perfectionist" in this context, but I must insist that I am carefully using these terms only as I have defined them herein.
36. I would say to them what I said to clients in my years as a corporate litigator: you can't expect to get, after a trial in which you lost, the same settlement you might have been offered before trial. Now that the Supreme Court will squarely face the constitutional question of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the religious right has lost much of its chance to propose compromise on recognition of same-sex marriage.
37. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 876.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 38 a case Laycock briefed and argued in the Supreme Court on behalf of the prevailing religious entity, part of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, a strong conservative voice in the sexual culture wars. 39 Although the law at issue in the case was the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 40 the sexual culture wars nevertheless played a central role at oral argument, with Justices from both the left and the right of the Court and even the advocate for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), taking it as a central and legitimate premise in support of the "ministerial exception" to the employment discrimination laws that " Kruger to Justice Breyer's statement: "So the fact if they want to choose to the priest, you could go to the Catholic Church and say they have to be women. I mean, you couldn't say that. That's obvious. So how are you distinguishing this?" See id. at 31-32. See also, e.g., id. at 43-44 (colloquy between Justice Alito and Ms. Kruger on the need for deference to the Catholic Church were it to claim that a female professor should not be tenured in canon law).. It is worthy of note that, in a disproportionate number of the prominent lower court cases holding that there was a ministerial exemption to the laws guaranteeing equal employment opportunity, the plaintiff whose claim was excluded by the ministerial exception was a woman or a gay man suing a religious organization that openly objected to full equality on grounds of sex or sexual orientation. Thus, Justice Alito's example of a "nun . . . [who] wanted a tenured position teaching canon law at Catholic University and . . . claimed that she was denied tenure . . . because of her gender" was, as he said, "a real case," id. at 43. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the ministerial exception applied to a tenured professorship in canon law and dismissing the Title VII claim of Sister Elizabeth McDonough).
"Citizens of the City of God United," 42 eviscerating the holding in Smith and ceding to religious institutions a constitutionally protected sphere of liberty they have never before enjoyed under U.S. law. be newly inviolable and private corporate space to be newly protected for the religious, but they have also vastly increased the ability of the religious to exert control over public governmental space 47 and resources.
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While conservative religious individuals and institutions insist on the freedom to exclude and discriminate against their opponents in the sexual culture wars (including, but not limited to, openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons, and heterosexuals to whose sexual, marital, or reproductive choices they claim to have religious objections), they, and the proponents of live-and-let-live solutions who support them in their demands to exclude, simultaneously insist that individuals and institutions committed to sexual equality and liberty should not be permitted to exclude or discriminate against, and indeed should be forced to accommodate and subsidize religious applicants who do not share and wish to be exempted from facilitating an institution's commitments to, for example, LGBT equality, the equality of the sexes or reproductive rights. As the examples discussed below will demonstrate, the proposal to live-and-let-live is radically asymmetrical, with religious opponents of sexual rights demanding both legal protection for their own space and the legal right to invade the space of their opponents.
Moreover, this insistence on nondiscrimination against and nonexclusion of religious opponents of sexual rights extends to an insistence that their access to government recognition and government funding be unimpeded, even when the reason government gives for declining recognition and funding is the religious organization's or individual's discriminatory policies with respect to sex, gender, or sexuality. For example, the draft accommodation proposal that Wilson, Berg, and others, with the support of Laycock and others, have sent to states considering legislative exemptions for those who claim a religious objection to providing goods and services for or recognition to a same-sex marriage, would not only protect the objecting service providers from suit by individuals to whom they refuse service or recognition, but would also legally guarantee that the refusal will not result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws of [the] State or its subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status. 49 This not only seeks to make discrimination as costless as possible for the religious, but would also deny to those states and their subdivisions committed to guaranteeing liberty and equality with respect to sex, gender, and sexuality the ability to vindicate these commitments, even in their choice of contracting partners and subsidy recipients. What then remains of the promise of letting not only religious conservatives, but also those with liberal egalitarian commitments in matters of sexuality and gender "live their own values"? What remains of a space in which they, too, can have their "rules control"?
Most of the proponents of live-and-let-live seem to treat any refusal to recognize, include, or subsidize religious opponents of sexual liberty and equality as unjustifiable discrimination against these religious opponents, rather than as merely an attempt by proponents of sexual equality and liberty to maintain a space in which to live their own values. In the name of living-and-letting-live, for example, many express indignation rather than support for the result in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 50 even though all Hastings College of the Law sought to withhold in that case from a campus group that excluded some students on the basis of religion and sexual orientation was official recognition and subsidies, not categorically the ability to meet or advertise on campus. 51 In the name of living-andletting-live, many similarly complain of and would seek to reverse, through legislatively mandated accommodations and exemptions, the results in cases such as those involving Ocean Grove Camp Meeting in New Jersey, 52 Catholic Charities in Illinois, 53 and the Boy Scouts in Connecticut, 54 although, in each of these cases, the harm suffered by the religious organization in question was simply its inability to benefit from certain 50. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (upholding policy of a state-sponsored law school of only giving official recognition to student groups that agreed to admit "all comers" and not exclude students based on forbidden grounds including religion and sexual orientation). 51. Id. at 671-73. For an example of the hostile reaction of live-and-let-live proponents to the result in Christian Legal Society, see, for example Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 428-29 (arguing that the Court should have held there was a "free speech problem" with the rules applied in Christian Legal Society); Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 868-69 (mocking the notion that "a student religious group's statement of faith is religious discrimination" ).
52. government subsidies or government contracts so long as it refused to abide by the nondiscrimination conditions placed on the contracts and subsidies by the government entities paying for them, which were themselves committed to a policy of nondiscrimination.
Finally, the accommodations and exemptions now being sought by religious conservatives in the sexual culture wars are vastly more expansive than the paradigm cases of religious accommodation in U.S. law to which proponents of granting such exemptions under the banner of live-and-letlive seek to assimilate them, notably the exemption of pacifist Quakers from the draft and of Catholic hospitals from performing nontherapeutic abortions.
Perhaps the best way of illustrating just how far from "honor[ing] America's . . . long and rich tradition of religious freedom" 55 granting these expansive new claims for exemption would be is to examine these new claims in light of Justice Benjamin Cardozo's concurring opinion in a case that should be far more prominent than it is in discussions of religious accommodation. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 56 the Supreme Court unanimously declined to grant a religious exemption from a required course in military science and tactics to pacifist Methodist students at a state-sponsored school. Justice Cardozo began his analysis of why the case involves no "obstruction by the state to 'the free exercise' of religion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation, and by the generations that have followed" by observing:
55. Letter from Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 1. In this and their other letters urging legislative exemptions for religious opponents of same-sex marriage, Wilson et al. claim that it is part of the American tradition of religious liberty that accommodations should "serve the purpose of insulating conscientious objectors from penalties at the hands of the government." They then treat as the sort of penalty from which conscientious objectors ought to be insulated any refusal by government to exempt the objector from generally applicable conditions on government subsidies or contracts. Id. at 13. Do they therefore see the result and the reasoning in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, see infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text, as contrary to the American tradition of religious liberty?
56. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); id. at 265-68 (Cardozo, J., concurring). The Cardozo concurrence in Hamilton is not the only opinion by a highly-regarded Justice concerning religious freedom that I wish had not fallen so far out of the canon. See also Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 180, 181-82 (1943) (Jackson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Religious freedom in the long run does not come from this kind of license to each sect to fix its own limits, but comes of hardheaded fixing of those limits by neutral authority with an eye to the widest freedom to proselyte compatible with the freedom of those subject to proselyting pressures. . . . This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added. So it was with liberty of contract, which was discredited by being overdone. The Court is adding a new privilege to override the rights of others to what has before been regarded as religious liberty.").
The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. They have not even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join in courses of instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an institution for higher education maintained with the state's moneys, then and only then they are commanded to follow courses of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This may be condemned by some as unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is violence to conscientious scruples, either religious or merely ethical. More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. 57 Justice Cardozo went on to note that, while "[f]rom the beginnings of our history, Quakers and other conscientious objectors have been exempted . . . from military service," this was not only a mere "act of grace," but also "the exemption, when granted, ha[d] been coupled with a condition, at least in many instances, that they supply the army with a substitute or with the money necessary to hire one."
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These specific points are illuminating enough when translated to the present situation. As Justice Cardozo makes clear, the history of free exercise in America demonstrates that a religious accommodation, even when granted, need not be costless to those who receive it, and that conditioning state subsidies on compliance with state policies does not violate the religious liberty of those who choose to avail themselves of the subsidy. He goes on to speak more generally: Never in our history has the notion been accepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to service in the camp or field are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt, in law or in morals, from regulation by the state. . . .
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principle-which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an errordoes not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law.
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As I see it, every point Cardozo makes about the claims of the plaintiffs in Hamilton is true a fortiori of the new proposals for religious exemption now championed in the context of the sexual culture wars. Having set forth in general terms my concerns about the viability a liveand-let-live approach to religious accommodation in the sexual culture wars, I will now examine a few of the many serious problems in more detail. One overarching theme of the problems I shall discuss is that of an asymmetry I'm tempted to call "live-and-let-die." 60 The proponents of living-and-letting-live disregard (or in some instance actively embrace) extremely troubling asymmetries: (1) in the accommodation sought to be granted to religious opponents of sexual civil rights as compared with that offered to religious opponents of almost anything else that secular law requires or protects; (2) in the space sought to be granted to religious opponents of sexual civil rights and those they would offer to proponents of those rights; and (3) in the harms suffered by religious objectors seeking accommodation and the harms suffered by those whom they would be excused from serving, including, or treating equally.
As I have previously observed, what helped the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses work so well together to maintain religious peace and freedom for so long was that, fortunately, as concerns free exercise, "most of the deepest disagreements between major religious groups in the United States in prior centuries happened to be about what to believe and how to worship rather than how to live in society. 62 As the outcomes in Reynolds and Smith demonstrate, accommodating religiously motivated differences in how to live has always been much more difficult and less readily attainable than accommodating differences about what to believe. The problems of accommodating religious differences about how to live in society, such as those at issue in the sexual culture wars, are compounded in present-day America, not only by the increasing diversity of religious views about how to live, but also by the increasingly interconnected way groups and individuals do in fact live. Moreover, in contradistinction to most of the exemption claims put forward in the context of sexual rights, earlier free exercise claims such as those in Reynolds and Smith involved efforts on the part of believers to engage in To make this descriptive observation is not at all to claim that religion should be or is confined to belief and worship. Of course, many devout believers incorporate their faith into every aspect of their lives, but, let me repeat what I said previously: in my view, the Reynolds Court had it right that this cannot make the religious laws unto themselves. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
62. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648-51 (1996) (Scalia J. dissenting) (drawing analogies between condemnation of polygamy in the nineteenth century and condemnation of homosexuality in the twentieth and observing the numerous respects in which the Supreme Court had found it to be constitutional to make criminal and otherwise legally disadvantage the religiously motivated conduct of polygamists). A more minor exception, the use of controlled mind-altering drugs in religious ritual, was held by the Supreme Court not to require a religious exemption from a general law making use of such drugs illegal. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82, 890. As noted supra note 61, because it involved the sacramental use of controlled substances, Smith is also a dispute about how to worship, but the particular form of worship also quite directly involves a contested way of living in society, as would, to an even greater degree, claims for freedom of worship involving human sacrifice. This is a familiar issue in free speech cases-all speech is also noise; all press, at least before the computer age, is also litter. Just as government is not categorically barred from regulating noise because it takes the form of words, it is not categorically barred from regulating actions because believers invest them with religious significance. For further discussion see Case, supra note 42. primary religiously mandated conduct, rather than efforts to avoid being complicit with, tainted by or implicated in the religiously condemned conduct of others. 63 In these and many other respects, claims for exemption made in the context of the current "national conversation on political and cultural issues related to sexuality" 64 extend well beyond what was even claimed by, let alone granted to, earlier religious conscientious objectors to secular law. 65 Proponents of live-and-let-live have also yet to come to terms with the fact that issues of sexual rights are far from the only issues about how to live in society as to which there is strong religiously motivated objection by some to the lives and actions of others.
66 They need to clarify the extent to which their proposed framework should be, or the reasons why it should not be, applied to any of these other issues. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out in her Hobby Lobby dissent, even if one limits the field of inquiry only to the very narrow question of religiously motivated objections to aspects of the provision of health care coverage, there are "religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah's Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)," each of which must either be accorded the same deference granted to religiously motivated objections to the contraceptive 63. A discussion of the implications and limits of this distinction is far beyond the scope of this Essay. In raising it here, I do not mean to suggest that avoiding contamination by or cooperation, however remote, with what one's faith sees as evil cannot be equally important to believers as themselves refraining from the relevant evil acts. I am simply highlighting once again the extent to which claims for accommodation in the sexual rights context are, if not entirely unprecedented, importantly different from most earlier claims for religious accommodation. mandate or adequately distinguished. 67 Broadening the horizon, Justice Ginsburg also enumerated just a few of the many "commercial enterprises [in addition to Hobby Lobby] seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of their religious beliefs," citing already litigated cases in which enterprises objected to dealing with blacks, unmarried heterosexual cohabitants, "young, single wom[e]n working without [their] father's consent," "married wom[e]n working without [their] husband's consent," and any person "antagonistic to the Bible," including "fornicators and homosexuals." 68 She asked, "Would RFRA require exemptions in cases of this ilk? And if not, how does the Court divine which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which are not? Isn't the Court disarmed from making such a judgment . . . ?" 69 Similarly, I warned in 2009 that even if, arguendo, the proponents of live-and-let-live are right going forward about the small number of likely exemption claims arising from same-sex marriage and related gay rights issues (an assumption about which I will raise questions below) " [t] here is every reason to think that" a multiplicity of other analogous "religious exemptions will . . . often be sought. A glance at the docket of a single federal judge, my colleague Frank Easterbrook, gives some sense of the range of already litigated cases on such issues." 70 Religious opposition to gay people was involved in some of Judge Easterbrook's public employment cases; for example, the case of a cosmetology instructor who persisted in proselytizing students in her clinic, 71 but he also was faced with the complaints of a Roman Catholic FBI agent who refused on religious grounds to investigate peaceful anti-war protestors, 72 a Baptist police officer who refused on religious grounds to accept an assignment at a casino, 73 a Black Muslim prisoner who refused on religious grounds, while on kitchen duty, to clean pork off food trays, 74 and a Christian prisoner who objected on religious grounds to being exposed to observation by female guards. 75 Holding that the Baptist policeman, just like the Catholic FBI Agent, was not entitled to the requested religious accommodation and could be fired, Easterbrook observed: Looking beyond one judge's cases, to the newspaper headlines, would multiply the potential claims for exemption a thousandfold. For example, when it first hit the headlines that Muslim cab drivers at the MinneapolisSt. Paul Airport would not serve passengers carrying duty-free liquor, "officials of the Metropolitan Airports Commission proposed colorcoded lights on cab roofs to indicate whether the driver would accept a passenger carrying alcohol." 77 After more than 5,000 documented taxi refusals at the airport and countless more passengers involuntarily dropped off somewhere between the airport and their destination as soon it became clear to their driver that they were carrying alcohol, authorities dropped all talk of a religious exemption and instead upped the penalty for refusal from being sent to the end of the cab line to a thirty-day taxi license suspension for a first offense and a two-year taxi license revocation for a second offense. 78 Twin Cities Muslim cab drivers also repeatedly refused to carry passengers with dogs, including seeing-eye dogs. 79 The overwhelming majority of cabbies in the airport area are Somali Muslims and there is every reason to think offering a religious exemption to such drivers would serve to increase the number who insist on one, because failure to insist on one will mark the driver in the eyes of the community as a bad Muslim. 80 (Compare, here, the argument that civil rights laws mandating that blacks be served by businesses in the South solved the collective action problem faced by business owners pressured by their white racist customers to remain segregated.) Advocates of exemptions from public accommodation laws for service providers who refuse to provide flowers or cake for samesex wedding celebrations have yet to explain whether and why the claims of these Christian bakers and florists are more worthy of accommodation than those of Minneapolis's Muslim cab drivers, who also wish to avoid "cooperating in sin." 81 Some proponents of religious exemptions in the context of the sexual culture wars have also suggested that the state should be foreclosed from requiring public employees to participate in diversity training classes 82 or from telling students of social work that it is "simply not acceptable for social workers to view homosexual people as perverse." 83 This too, opens up the possibility of a host of analogous religious accommodation claims going far beyond gay rights. Would the same analysis apply to a school telling students it was training in clinical psychology that it was not acceptable for them to view mentally ill people as possessed by demons, especially considering that exorcism is still practiced by many traditional religions? 84 If not, why not?
Although the first inclination of those arguing for live-and-let-live solutions to the sexual culture wars may be to say that addressing any other religious exemption questions is beyond the scope of their project, a law reform proposal that cannot be generalized to other similar issues is at best of limited usefulness, at worst dangerous and unconstitutional. Justice Ginsburg is clearly correct to warn, in her Hobby Lobby dissent, of the risk of "havoc" 85 and the absence of a "stopping point" 86 if exemptions are granted to all those with claims analogous to those put forth by religious opponents of sexual rights. On the other hand, granting exemptions only to religious objectors to sexual rights, and not to other similarly situated conscientious objectors on other issues could itself raise constitutional problems under the federal Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses as well as state constitutional provisions such as California's No Preference Clause. 87 As Justice Ginsburg also warned in her Hobby Lobby dissent, "approving some religious claims while deeming others unworthy of accommodation could be 'perceived as favoring one religion over another,' the very 'risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude. '" 88 It is important to look at the risk of potentially unconstitutional favoritism implicit in proposals for special religious accommodations in the sexual culture wars from two distinct angles, considering the risk of problematic discrimination in both (A) which religious groups and viewpoints are deemed worthy of special accommodation and (B) which societal groups will be singled out for diminished protection and thus for harm by the proposed accommodation. Establishment Clause problems arise when a certain group of believers (notably the conservative 84. Consider that, in 2003, the Bush Justice Department investigated a complaint of religious discrimination against a Texas Tech biology professor who declined to write letters of recommendation for any student who could not "truthfully and forthrightly affirm a scientific answer" to the question "How do you think the human species originated?" Karen Brulliard evangelical Protestants and Catholics who would be the principal beneficiaries of religious accommodations in the context of the sexual culture wars) is extended accommodation not granted to others with analogous claims for accommodation, especially when those denied analogous accommodations come from faiths less numerically or culturally dominant. The constitutional concerns are compounded when one considers not only that the views of certain dominant religious groups are favored for accommodation by proponents of live-and-let-live, creating establishment clause problems, but also that the brunt of the proposed exemptions will fall almost exclusively on individual members of historically disadvantaged groups, notably gay men, lesbians and other women, creating equal protection problems. The problem here is precisely that which caused the Supreme Court to strike down the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") as unconstitutional. 89 In addition to potentially opening up the floodgates to a host of new potential claims for religious exemption by a host of different kinds of service providers who seek to avoid serving a host of different clients for a host of different religious reasons, proposals to live-and-let-live, if taken seriously, risk upsetting settled law denying religious accommodation to those who claim a religious objection to associating with blacks or Jews or women on terms of equality. Though few today would seek an exemption from dealing with blacks, there is every reason to believe that had such an exemption been made available earlier, it not only would have been asserted, it might have become entrenched. As William Eskridge has documented, the interaction of traditional religions with the black civil rights movement in the United States has been dynamic-denied an accommodation for the exclusion of blacks, traditional religious groups gradually accommodated themselves to their inclusion. 90 Unfortunately, traditional religions have not yet internalized United States constitutional norms of sex equality to even a significant fraction of the same extent as they have internalized such norms on racial integration in the course of the last half century. Nor, unfortunately, is it likely as a matter of fact that judges and legislators would view religious exemptions from constitutional and statutory sex equality norms to be quite as far out of bounds as exemptions from norms on race, 91 as the carefully phrased dicta in Justice Samuel Alito's Hobby Lobby majority opinion confirm.
92
Whether or not there have been or will continue to be few cases in which "a right is asserted to discriminate against gay people precisely as such," 93 there have been an abundance of cases in which on religious grounds, "a right is asserted to discriminate against [women] precisely as such." Whether under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, numerous employers have litigated and lost their claim that their religious views justified them in refusing to hire or promote women or to pay them equally with men. 94 I am even more afraid than I was when I first squarely confronted the issue in 2009 that live-and-let-live proposals risk not only upsetting this settled law but also expanding the range of employers who could use religious exemptions to discriminate against women. This worries me profoundly 91 . But see generally Case, supra note 16 (arguing that, as a matter of law, an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes is incumbent on state actors in the United States, including judges and legislators, whenever they act or speak).
92. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (majority opinion). Very carefully mentioning only race, and not, for example, sex, let alone sexual orientation, Alito insists:
The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Note how the words "for example," central to Ginsburg's challenge, drop out of Alito's reassurances, such that only race, but not other forbidden grounds for employment discrimination, are announced by the majority to be immune from interference through RFRA. This is just one of many ways in which Alito's opinion in Hobby Lobby is slippery, and calls for careful textual scrutiny to see exactly how little he has actually done to answer the dissent's objections, or indeed, to resolve the issues presented by the case. While further discussion is beyond the scope of this Essay, I am of the view that the text of Justice Alito's Hobby Lobby opinion shows that he has not yet understood or grown into his role as a Supreme Court Justice. The opinion is that of a clever lawyer seeking not to get trapped, not that of a judge whose job, beyond resolving the case before him, is to provide guidance to lower court judges, rather than loopholes to advocates, as they deal with the next generation of related cases.
93. Koppelman & Dent, supra note 1 at 5.. 94. See, e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting religious exemption from Title VII claimed by a christian school that wished to use "doctrinal beliefs held by the Church . . . that, while the sexes are equal in dignity before God, they are differentiated in role. . . . [and] that in any marriage, the husband is the head of the household," to give lesser pay and benefits to female teachers). As previously noted, and as discussed in greater detail in Case, supra note 42, the constitutionalization of the ministerial exemption in Hosanna-Tabor already vastly expands the protected scope for religiously justified discrimination against women, notwithstanding the protections civil rights laws have sought to extend to them. Legislatively granted accommodations and exemptions will compound the problem.
both as a feminist and as a constitutional lawyer.
Nor am I reassured by the insistence of proponents of live-and-let-live that while religious liberty may be in great peril, women's rights are secure, that there is of course no danger of retrogression on aspects of our current law crucial to women's legal and social equality.
95 I am also a comparativist and a student of history.
96 I look at the women of Afghanistan, in modern dress and in the labor force in the mid-twentieth century, in burkas and confined to the home as a matter of law by that century's end; and similarly at the women of Iran, Iraq, and Israel, 97 to name just a few of the other countries in which increasing religious demands for sex segregation, for the exclusion of women from the public sphere, even for outright female subordination, have gained rather than lost traction in law as the result of religious demands in the course of my lifetime, 98 and I am anything but reassured. I also note that, as members of the Hobby Lobby majority have very recently acknowledged, demands for religious accommodation are infinitely expandable: in many religions, as a matter of religious principle, a believer strives asymptotically to approach perfect observance, demanding ever more of him or herself, and correspondingly of the state by way of accommodation or exemption from laws that stand in the way of more perfect observance. 99 This is yet another 98. Retrogression has also happened here in the United States. Again, recall that even the Catholic Church itself, in California, was providing contraception and same-sex partner benefits to its own employees for decades before the ACA, although it now refuses to do so and the Court seems to be backing it up.
99. During the oral argument of Holt v. Hobbs, in which Laycock represented a Muslim prisoner who successfully sought the accommodation of growing a half-inch beard despite prison rules requiring that he shave, Laycock was berated in turn by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice John Roberts. Roberts sense in which there is, as Justice Ginsburg says, no "stopping point." In her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Ginsburg asked about the majority's proposed less restrictive alternative of having the government pay directly for contraception, "where is the stopping point to the 'let the government pay' alternative?" 100 There is similarly no stopping point with analogous claims and no stopping point down the slippery slope to demands to be exempt from ever more remote connection with the religiously impermissible act. 101 Consider the ever expanding reach of persons who seek accommodation or exemption due to their conscientious objection to participating in abortions-the range of individuals raising such claims has expanded from physicians actually performing abortions, to ambulance drivers and IV nurses, to pharmacists objecting to dispensing not only the morning after pill, but also condoms.
This ever expanding circle of conscientious objectors to the provision of various aspects of women's reproductive health care has had among its powerful legal weapons the Church Amendment, which provides:
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions. 103 One way to probe the extent to which proponents of live-and-let-live are serious about the symmetry of their assertion that "[i]f we are to preserve liberty for both sides in the culture wars, then we have to preserve some space where each side can live its own values and where its rules control," 104 is to consider what support they would offer to someone who sought to mobilize the Church Amendment as a conscientious objector against the values of traditional conservative religion in the sexual culture wars. Note that the Church Amendment on its face protects persons motivated not only by "religious beliefs" but also by "moral convictions." I myself have a profound moral conviction that no child, but especially not a girl child, should be born into a family in which women are systematically subordinated to men and forced into traditional sex-roles. 105 As noted above, I have previously called this moral conviction feminist fundamentalism, defined as an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes and the abolition of fixed sex roles. 106 If I were an obstetrician-gynecologist, would I be fully accommodated in a refusal to provide services that would facilitate the reproduction of a Quiverful family or an FLDS family or a woman who came to my office in a burka with a husband who did all the talking for her? Would the supporters of live-and-let-live be as eager to defend me as they are to defend religiously motivated conscientious objectors to the provision of contraceptives? I could ask similar questions with respect to any of the proposals for following an abortion" as follows: "In construing language of this sort, a rational, reasonable and sensible approach has to be taken. If it were otherwise, one could eventually get to the point where the man who mines the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a factory to make instruments used in abortions could refuse to work on conscientious grounds. Reductio ad absurdum.").
103. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2012). 104. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 839 (emphasis added). 105. For further discussion, see generally Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship, supra note 11 (describing an uncompromising commitment to sex equality and the abolition of fixed sex roles).
106. I have set forth some of the ways in which I am prepared, if necessary, to be a martyr to this moral conviction in Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship, supra note 11.
